ANATOMY OF THE CATCH
Inside the football mind of Bill Walsh

Jan. 10, 2012, celebrates a pivotal date in professional football and Bay Area sports history: the 30th anniversary of a play simply known forever as "The Catch."

The touchdown pass from Joe Montana to Dwight Clark with only 51 seconds remaining in the NFC championship game at Candlestick Park is considered by many football aficionados as a significant turning point in NFL history: the start of the Bill Walsh-coached 49ers championship run during the 1980s and the end of the Tom Landry-led Dallas Cowboys dynasty of the 1970s. With that pass and the ensuing point-after, the 49ers came from behind on a 14-play, four-minute, 90-yard drive to defeat the Cowboys 28-27 as dusk approached on that late Sunday afternoon in January 1982.

In his 2009 book "The Catch" Gary Myers wrote: "Walsh was building a team that would last in San Francisco, winning four more Super Bowls [after its first one in 1982] in the next thirteen seasons, the greatest run for any team in the Super Bowl era. If they had not defeated Dallas in that landmark game, the 49ers might never gone on to win all those Super Bowls. They could have been nothing more than a shooting star, flashing across the sky and disappearing. It's happened so many times in NFL history."

The pass play itself, Brown Left Slot — Sprint Right Option, according to Peter Goodson, a quarterback guru, Walsh disciple and close friend of the late coach, "was unusual for the classic West Coast Offense, as it called for Montana to sprint to the right outside of the pocket away from the traditional pass protection pocket and to hope to isolate Clark against the Dallas cornerback. While there were other receiver options designed, as Bill always built in alternatives, against Dallas the play quickly became solely dependent on giving Clark time to work free of the very aggressive coverage. Freddy Solomon from his slot position running a quick shallow out had slipped, the tight end was covered on the back side, and a fierce Dallas pass rush emerged. The opponent had evaporated the 'options.' It was Clark or nothing."

Contrary to what many thought, Montana was not throwing the ball away. Clark was always an option. The mistaken belief that Montana was trying to throw the ball away and that Clark somehow miraculously caught it may have been the result of CBS Sports' Hank Stram telling an nationwide television audience near the end of the game that Clark had to make an adjustment to catch Montana's throw, when it was always part of his planned route.

"The primary receiver [Solomon] was covered," recalled Montana in his 1997 book, "Joe Montana's Art and Magic of Quarterbacking," "and the Dallas pass rush was closing in. I had to put it up there, where if Dwight couldn't get it, no one could. I was moving backward, off-balance, and throwing on my toes with my left foot off the ground. Not exactly perfect form, but that's where all those drills paid off."

"The 'anatomy of The Catch' exemplified the Walsh doctrine of excellence," added Goodson. "The choreographed design of the play synchronizing time and space to advantage, endless hours of practice on the skills necessary to perfect each and every player's role and the game plan that recognizes when and why to call the play. The action on the field started with Bill looking at his red zone category listed in his game plan sheet that was always glued to his hand on game days. He knew Sprint Right Option was perfect for just such a time and in practice it had looked unstoppable, particularly to the right, where it favored Joe's right-handed throwing motion so he did not have to turn to throw off his backside. The primary two purposes of Sprint Right Option were first to foil what Bill brilliantly assumed would be a Dallas blitz aimed at sacking Montana in the pocket and second, to allow Clark time to work a triple move maneuver to get separation from the Dallas cornerback. Bill intuitively knew the Cowboys would be in man-to-man coverage versus a softer zone on the game's most crucial down, with the goal line a chip shot away."

"It was a play we always ran," Clark was quoted as saying in Montana's book. "My job was to find Joe, and once he found me, slide along the end line. By the time he saw me, he was desperate … There was no other place Joe could have thrown the ball. If it had been anywhere else, [Dallas cornerback] Everson Walls would have made a play on it."

"The foundation of the success of "The Catch" is built on the pass protection." notes Goodson. " You must have time to make the coaches drawings work … A frenzied defensive front's rush is fooled by the quarterback's lateral movement and is trapped by its own momentum. Dallas was turned into a victim of its own aggression from expecting Montana to be eight yards behind his center setting up to throw. To their shock Joe was not there. The offensive line utilizes turn protection so it slides to the side Montana is sprinting away to and turns back to adjust to the new angle of the defensive pursuit which takes advantage of the overly aggressive Dallas front gaining valuable time for Clark to do his thing."

And while "The Catch" was officially recorded as a 6-yard pass, the throw actually covered almost 25 yards, with Montana finally releasing the ball over the rush of three Dallas defenders near the sideline on the Cowboys' 14-yard line — after rolling right with a pair of pump fakes — and Clark then catching it in the back of the end zone.

"The receivers work in tandem to create the opportunity for 'The Catch,' " continued Goodson, "The slot, Solomon, runs a quick shallow out while his defender is chasing him like a dog on a bone, opening a huge hole underneath for Clark if he can break free. Solomon appears to stumble, but mission accomplished. Clark runs what appears to be a quick post inside underneath the covering corner. At the top of the route near the goal posts Dwight sticks his foot in the ground and pivots back to the outside toward the direction of Joe's sprint. The corner is beat as Dwight has a step on him. Bill always jokingly called this move 'shaking the tail off the dog.' In the final path Clark must be running parallel to the end line exactly one and a half yards inside the back of the end zone stripe expecting the ball to be thrown high and probably requiring a leap to bring it in."

"Bill was insistent that plays along the back line in the end zone have only two possibilities: a catch or a throwaway," concluded Goodson. "Any red zone interceptions were unthinkable, especially with a fourth down available if the ball falls incomplete. So while many people think the ball was overthrown and a leaping catch was the saving grace, they miss Bill's penchant for detail and the accountability of his players for every aspect of each play in varying situations on the field."